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Author(s): Louis Roberts

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ORIGEN AND STOIC LOGIC

LOUIS ROBERTS

Syracuse University

A principle of Neoplatonic theurgy was that in working magic spells one must never translate foreign words.[1] Origen, the Christian Neoplatonist of Alexandria, refers to this principle several times. These references as well as numerous other problems cannot be understood apart from Origen's use of certain principles derived from Stoic logic. How deep in debt Origen was to Stoicism has not yet been determined, but his use of Stoic logic has been almost entirely ignored.[2] In this paper I shall indicate three areas in Origen's works which may have been greatly influenced by Stoic logic, the problem of names, the question of the truth-value of propositions, and the use of argument-schemes. The thread connecting all three areas is the general Stoic doctrine of truth. I suggest that a good deal more Stoic logic may lurk hitherto undetected in Origen.

I. MAGIC SPELLS AND NAMES

Seneca (*Ep.* 89, 17) and Diogenes Laertius (7.43; 62) report that Chrysippus divided logic into two parts, the first dealing with signs and the second with what is signified. This distinction was not always

[1] See E. R. Dodds, "Theurgy and its Relationship to Neoplatonism," *JRS* 37 (1947) 63. Sufficient bibliography may be found in this article. The principal classical statement is Iamblichus, *De Myst.* 7, 5.

[2] The chief work on the subject of Stoicism in the Fathers, Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l'église* (Paris 1957) ignores Origen completely, treating the period ending at A.D. 230. Other works which treat the problem but ignore the question of logic are: Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition* (New York 1966); A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, *Christian Faith* and *Greek Philosophy* (New York 1960); Henry Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Stoa," *JTS* 48 (1947) 34–48.

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observed and in practice could not be. For Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 8.11) reports that the Stoics connected that which exists, the sign, and the signified with each other. The sign, he says, is the sound (ἡ φωνή), for example, the sound "Dion." That which exists is the object, Dion himself. Both sign and object are bodies. But the third element, the signified, is said to be immaterial. It is what we apprehend as subsisting together with our thought; it is what the Greeks but not the Barbarians are able to grasp when they hear Greek words spoken. In other words, it is the "sense" or "meaning." A technical term for this was τὸ πρᾶγμα. It expressed the meaning of the λεκτόν.

Origen is quite clear on the bodily nature of objects and of sounds. He specifies the physical nature of the latter by referring to it (*Contra Celsum* 6.62)[3] as "vibrated air, or a percussion of air, or a kind of air, or any other such definition which experts in these matters give to the sounds." Origen also makes use of the term τὸ πρᾶγμα in its technical sense of the meaning of the proposition.

Unless we recognize this technical use of *pragma*, we fail to appreciate Origen's explanation of the prohibition against translation when working magic spells. He furnishes the doctrine of the various philosophical schools on "names" (1.24), and, regarding the Stoa, he says: νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα. We mistake the intention of the author if we translate as does Chadwick: "as the Stoics hold, by nature, the first utterances being imitations of the things described and becoming their names. . . ."[4] *Things* connotes physicality, whereas what is intended is the *sense* or *meaning*. The sounds are said to be imitations of what is meant, not of things. Origen makes this doubly clear (1.25): οὕτως οὐ τὰ σημαινόμενα κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀλλ' αἱ τῶν φωνῶν ποιότητες καὶ ἰδιότητες ἔχουσί τι δυνατὸν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς τάδε τινὰ ἢ τάδε. Chadwick again misses the point by translating: "Thus it is not the significance of things which the words describe that has a certain

[3] Henceforth I shall refer to the *Contra Celsum* simply by book and chapter, e.g., (1.24); other works of Origen which are cited less frequently will have a fuller reference, e.g., (*Fr. in Joann.* 2.4). The text of the *Contra Celsum* is the excellent new edition by M. Borret in the *Sources Chrétiennes* series.

[4] Henry Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge 1965) 23.

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power to do this or that, but it is the qualities and characteristics of the sound."[5] Origen argues that a man who pronounces a given spell in its native language can effect what the spell claims to bring about. However, should he translate the spell into another language, it loses its power, because the magic attaches to the physical body of the sound and not to the *pragmata*.

Origen resumes this question several books later (5.45). "We briefly dealt with this question above when we said that if names whose nature it is to be powerful in some particular language are translated into another, they no longer have any effect such as they had with their proper sounds." The entire chapter develops the notion that the magic power associated with names attaches to the sound and not the meaning. Origen gives an illustration: "If, then, neither Sabaoth nor Adonai have any effect when translated into what they seem to mean in the Greek sound (εἰς ἃ δοκεῖ σημαίνειν ἐν ἑλλάδι φωνῇ) so much the more would the names of Zeus be powerless when translated."

The initial importance of this emphasis on the Stoic[6] use of *pragma* may not be apparent. To ignore it, however, can lead to serious misinterpretation. Henri Crouzel, for example, writes: "Origène croit en ce qui concerne l'origine des noms à une relation réelle, de nature quasi magique, entre le signifiant et le signifié. . . ."[7] The magic was a property of the physical sound and not a matter of the relation between sign and signified!

Origen, therefore, gave an explanation derived from Stoic logic to the principle of Neoplatonic theurgy forbidding the translation of names when working magic. This was by no means his only use of this part of Stoic logic. It colors other parts of his work as well. In particular it affects his method of argument.

At the very beginning of the *Contra Celsum*, where Origen explains his purpose, we read (*Praef.* 1): ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἐναργοῦς ἐλέγχου ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ πάντων . . . γραμμάτων. Chadwick translates "as though there were not in the mere facts a clear refutation better

[5] Chadwick (above, note 4) 25.

[6] It may be incorrect to call this usage specifically Stoic. See Jürgen Mau, "Stoische Logik," *Hermes* 85 (1957) 152.

[7] Henri Crouzel, *Origène et la philosophie* (Paris 1962) 60. Crouzel does admit the great extent of Stoic influences. "Le milieu de la Stoa est plus familier à Origène, mais son stoïcisme n'a pas été jusqu'ici bien étudié." (36).

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than any written reply."[8] Origen's point, however, is that in Celsus' very meaning we find a better refutative argument than in any written answer. There is no question of "fact" involved. Origen argues throughout the work that he can demonstrate the falsity of Celsus' arguments from their consequences.[9] He indicates his method (1.11.12) of examining meanings and responding as they demand. His demonstrations then often hinge on a Stoic doctrine of truth which is a property of the λεκτόν.

In our next section we will observe examples of this doctrine of truth. First we should note the frequency of this logical use of *pragma*. The term *pragma* occurs in the *Contra Celsum* a total of eighty-three times. Of this total, seven instances are independent of the special technical use. The other instances either clearly imply logical usage or are open to this kind of interpretation.[10] The Stoic use may be very important in understanding Origen's explanations of the mysteries of the ideal world found in the first fifteen chapters of the *Commentarium in Joannem*.[11] For we read there (2.4) of sounds which explicitly signify meanings (αἱ σημαίνουσαι φωναὶ καθαρῶς τὰ πράγματα). Marguerite Harl tends to take *pragmata* in these passages to mean "realités".[12] There are cases where it does have this meaning,[13] but the presence of other Stoic terms as well as the context favors a logical interpretation.

This usage is also part of the underpinning for Origen's adoption of

[8] Chadwick (above, note 4) 3. M. Borret also mistranslates: "dans les faits une refutation et un discours plus fort que tous les écrits." *Origène, Contre Celse* I (Paris 1967) 65. Paul Koetschau makes the same mistake: "Liegt nicht ein schlagender Beweis in den Sachen selbst . . .?" *Des Origenes Acht Bücher Gegen Celsus* (München 1926) 2.

[9] Origen repeatedly attacks Celsus on the basis of the implications of Celsus' propositions. See for example 3, 69, 80; 4.90, 97; 5.7, 36; 6.72; 8.16, 21, 51.

[10] This technical use of *pragma* is found in Origen's other works. For example in the *Comm. in Matth.* of sixty-one occurrences only eleven exclude this interpretation.

[11] For example, *Comm. in Joann.* 1.38 and see H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Greek Fathers* (Cambridge 1964) 268–72.

[12] Marguerite Harl, *Origène et la fonction révélatrice du verbe incarné* (Paris 1958) 143–45. M. Harl does seem to be aware of the technical meaning. See 372.

[13] It is remarkable that the only example from Origen of *pragma* cited by Lampe (*A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, 4) 1126 is an instance where it means "object" or "reality" from *Contra Celsum* 8, 12. Lampe gives no meaning or examples illustrating the logical usage.

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the distinction between λέγειν and προφέρεσθαι, the latter having to do with the sounds and the former with the sense or meaning.[14] This distinction is of fundamental importance in Origen's theology. This means that in Origen's thought a good deal more than an interest in names and etymology is Stoic. Origen was one with the Stoics in believing that searching for the meaning of words was the way to the λόγος of reality. Origen's method develops around this search, even though he gave a particularly Christian interpretation to λόγος. This interpretation bears on the Stoic doctrine of the truth-value of the λεκτὸν as opposed to truth as substantive.

II. STOIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRUTH OF PROPOSITIONS

Again it is Sextus Empiricus (*Hyp. Pyrrh.* 2.81; *Adv. Math.* 8.38) who reports completely on the distinction between the true (τὸ ἀληθές) and truth (ἡ ἀλήθεια). He says the true differs from truth in three ways: in essence, in constitution, and in meaning. The difference in essence is that the true is incorporeal, because it attaches to the proposition. Truth and the true differ in constitution, because truth implies knowledge of a number of truths, while the true is something simple. And they differ in meaning, because truth pertains to knowledge, while the true does not.

Origen finds this distinction most helpful. He consistently uses *truth* to refer to the reality of the "mystery" of the world of ideas, to what he considers the substantial character of the Logos,[15] and "true reason" as such.[16] *The true* he takes as a property of the proposition.[17]

[14] Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1959) 39, gives a good summary of this question: "Die schärfste Formulierung hat diese Zweiseitigkeit des Logos im Altertum dadurch erhalten, dass man zwei Logoi schied, den 'endiathetos', den im Innern gestalteten, und den 'prophororikos,' der durch die Stimme aus dem Innern hervordringt. Allein diese Lehre, die in der Kaiserzeit ungeheure Verbreitung gefunden und namentlich auf die theologische Spekulation eingewirkt hat, ist erst in der Zeit aufgekommen, als die Akademie des Karneades mit den Stoikern heftig über die Frage stritt, ob auch bei den Tieren ein Logos, Sprache und Denken, anzuerkennen sei." The question is of particular importance for Origen, because he was forever wrestling with the question of what levels of life were able to share in *logos*.

[15] For example, see *Contra Celsum* 3.37, 41; *Comm. in Joann.* 2.4; 4.24; *Comm. in Cantic.* 2 (*GCS* 8.160.18).

[16] *Comm. in Joann.* 2.37 (*GCS* 4.97.6); *Fragm. in Joann.* 6 (*GCS* 4.488.13); *Fragm. in Prov.* 1.3 *PG* 17 153B; *Contra Celsum* 8.21; 7.46.

[17] *Comm. in Joann.* 2.13 (*GCS* 4.82.3); *Contra Celsum* 5.7; 6.65; 3.35.

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Again, unless we observe these distinctions from Stoic logic, we cannot properly understand a number of Origen's arguments. For their validity depends on a Stoic doctrine of what is a true or false proposition.

Observe how Origen argues with the following paradox (2.7): "Just as one lie is not more untrue than any other lie, and is not a lie in any greater degree, so a truth is not more true than any other truth in a greater degree."[18] Origen usually takes this argument in conjunction with the Stoic teaching that there is an absolute difference between virtue and vice. As Cicero says (*De Fin.* 3.15) "*negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere.*" Origen refers to this teaching as a paradox,[19] and also presents it in synthetic form.[20] Later on in the *Contra Celsum* (3.42) we find the same argument with two substitutions. "For according to an exact argument neither is one incorruptible thing more incorruptible than any other incorruptible thing nor is any one corruptible thing more corruptible than the other." Origen seems to accept this argument wholeheartedly. For he proceeds to grant by way of hypothesis only that there *may* be degrees of corruptibility. How can he accept the argument or judge it valid?

In the first place we should notice how Origen introduces the argument on truth (2.7). He demands that Celsus give an account of "great and small lies." Then Origen reverses his field, saying that Celsus can be refuted in another way; and this is his argument. He simply posits the argument and then goes on to his next point. Clearly he thinks the argument stands by itself, and he thinks this is the case because it is formal and tautologous.

In the second place Origen begins the chapter containing the argument on corruptibility (3.42) by stating that Celsus does not at all speak like a logician (ὡς διαλεκτικός). We recall that Diogenes Laertius (7.43) reports that Stoic logic was known as dialectic. So when Origen introduces his argument, he intends to warn the reader that what follows is to be taken as pure dialectic. Hence the reader is to

[18] Diogenes Laertius (7.120) gives the exact form of the argument: εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὲς ἀληθοῦς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ψεῦδος ψεύδους . . . .

[19] *Comm. in Cantic.* 3 "From these (paradoxes) I think, certain wise men of the country have drawn their opinion that only the wise man is good and that every wicked man is bad." Cf. Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Orat. Pan.* 11 (*PG* 10, 1084C); *Comm. in Joann.* 2.16.

[20] *Comm. in Rom.* 3.1 (*PG* 14 927 BC).

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take the phrase τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον to mean that the argument is exact or careful. Chadwick and Borret[21] take the phrase to mean "strictly speaking." However Origen's normal expression for this is κυρίως.[22] If Origen's intention here is not to express something like "according to a strict argument," we cannot explain his later development of the hypothesis about matter being able to suffer qualitative change. This whole later development is contingent upon the self-sufficiency of the earlier argument.

Thirdly, Origen held that an argument is put together out of several *logoi* which are formed according to *theôrêmata* (*Fr. in Joann.* 2.7): λόγος γὰρ εἷς συνεστὼς ἐκ πλειόνων θεωρημάτων. A good translation for *theôrêmata* might be *rules*, as Origen says regarding rhetoric (6.59): τὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς θεωρήματα. Here the particular rules are those for arguments and the truth-value of propositions comprising arguments. The truth-values depended in turn on the validity of the inferences within the argument, which in turn was a matter of the rules. Since the arguments in 2.7 and 3.42 followed the rules, Origen could consider them valid and self-sufficient. The Stoics held that every proposition was either true or false; *tertium non datur*.[23] This will be clearer if we examine two arguments in which the form or scheme is all important.

III. STOIC ARGUMENT-SCHEMES IN THE "CONTRA CELSUM"

Origen preserves two examples of classic Stoic argument-schemes, the so-called (1) "idle argument" and that known as (2) τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν.[24] Both of these arguments seem superfluous in context, especially because they were well known and are so fully developed by Origen. It is hard to see what they contribute. Yet Origen clearly

[21] Chadwick (above, note 4) 156; Borret (above, note 8) 2.98.

[22] See for example 6.54, 55, 61, 66; 7.68; 8.21; *Comm. in Joann.* 2.4.

[23] See Mau (above, note 6) 153, 154. See also I. M. Bochenski, *A History of Formal Logic* (Notre Dame 1961) 117 and W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford 1962) 136.

[24] Galen (*De Hypoc. et Plat.* plac. 2.3 = *SVF* 2.248) refers to the argument as the "syllogism of two or three conditionals." A good definition of τροπικόν is given by Benson Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley 1953) 136: "The molecular major premise of an undemonstrated argument, especially a conditional."

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intends them to play a role in his own argument. Let us consider each example in turn.

(1) Origen gives two examples of the "idle argument" (2.20).

> If it is fated that you recover from the illness, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; moreover, if it is fated that you will not recover from the illness, you will not recover, whether you call in the physician or not; either it is fated that you will recover from the illness, or it is fated that you will not do so; therefore it is futile to call in a physician.

Origen says another argument just like this would be,

> If it is fated that you beget a child, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not, you will beget a child; but if it is fated that you will not beget a child, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not, you will not beget a child; either it is fated that you will beget or you will not beget a child; therefore it is futile to have intercourse with a woman.

It is necessary to see how Origen uses these arguments, if they are not to appear superfluous in his development. Fortunately he provides an important clue. He says, "We have provided all these arguments on account of the notion put forward by the most clever Celsus."

The "idle argument" was sometimes used as an anti-Stoic argument and was opposed by granting free will.[25] Origen is not using it in this way at all. He is using it logically. Where possible, Origen strives to refute Celsus on the basis of the meaning or implications of Celsus' own argumentation.[26] In this case he distinguishes what Celsus has said.

> If by *assuredly* (*πάντως*) he means 'necessarily,' we will not grant that to him; for it was possible that it not happen. But if by *assuredly* he means simply that it will happen, and nothing hinders that from being true, even if it is possible for it not to happen, then my position is in no way affected.

Why is Origen's position in that case in no way affected? The answer must relate to his use of the preceding "idle argument." Alexander of Aphrodisias (*De Fato* 10 = *SVF* 2.961) provides an additional clue. Referring to the proposition "There will be a

[25] For this anti-Stoic interpretation, Cicero, *De Fato* 12.28; see also Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus and the Stoa" (above, note 2) 35.

[26] For example 3.32; 4.58, 97; 6.72; 8.21, 51.

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shipwreck tomorrow," he says it is true but not necessary. A non-necessary proposition is one which is true and is capable of being false (Diogenes Laertius 7.75).

Origen intends his "idle argument" to serve as a paradigm of the type of argument he is using. The examples give the needed warning about the dialectical nature of his distinction. This instance, then, confirms the suggestion made by Mates that Diodorus usually predicates necessity of what are in effect propositional functions.[27]

(2) Origen does the same sort of thing in his use of another Stoic argument-scheme, that from two conditionals. Related to the doctrine of truth as in or about propositions was the teaching that certain schemata were said to be true for all or some of the values of their variables. Origen preserves in its pristine Stoic form a most important example of this in the argument from two conditionals (7.15).

> But when two conditional propositions result in opposite conclusions by the logical theorem known as that from two conditionals, the antecedent of the two conditionals is denied.[28]

Origen even gives the schematic form which includes the variables.[29]

> If the first, then the second; if the first, then not the second; therefore, not the first.

He goes on to provide a Stoic example.

> The Stoics provide the following example of this when they say; if you know that you are dead, you are dead; if you know that you are dead, you are not dead; it follows that you do not know that you are dead.

He then gives the Stoic demonstration for the conditions.

> If you know that you are dead, what you know is true; then it is true that you are dead. And on the other hand, if you know that you are dead, it is

[27] See Mates (above, note 24) 39. What is specifically Diodorean or Chrysippean implication is still not solved.

[28] Sextus Empiricus (*Hyp. Pyrrh.* 2.3) mentions this argument-scheme: "Just as if one who did not know, should it happen, the argument of the reduction or that according to two conditionals (*τὸ διὰ δύο τροπικῶν*) could not say anything about them, so the man ignorant of each of the things said by the Dogmatists could not seek against them information of which he knows nothing."

[29] The use of variables in this way is a sure sign of Stoic influence. Origen reveals this influence elsewhere in his tendency to refer to propositions using variables. See *Comm. in Joann.* 1.34 and *Contra Celsum* 5.7. See also Alexander, *In Aristoteles An. Pr.* I (*CIAG* ii (i) 373).

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> also true that you know that you are dead. But inasmuch as a dead man knows nothing, clearly if you know that you are dead, you are not dead. And as I said before, it follows from both premisses that you do not know that you are dead.

Origen's purpose in citing this Stoic argument is the same as in the case of the "idle argument." Here, however, he argues that there is a similarity between what Celsus *means* and the Stoic argument. For on the assumptions of Celsus, the conditionals result in contradictory conclusions. He begins by saying that Celsus' hypothesis is absurd: *λεκτέον ὅτι ἡ ὑπόθεσις αὐτοῦ ἄτοπος οὖσα ποιήσαι ἂν συνημμένα εἰς τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἀντικείμενα λήγοντα.* The force of the argument is that of a *reductio ad absurdum.*

Such a reduction as well as the reduction of demonstrable arguments to indemonstrable ones was effected in Stoic logic by means of rules. Apuleius (*De Dogm. Plat.* 277) gives such a rule: "If some third is deduced from two, one of the two together with the opposition of the conclusion gives the opposite of the other." This was the standard method for reducing an argument to the impossible or absurd. It is with this method that Origen is working in *Contra Celsum* 7.15.[30]

Although Origen makes frequent use of such rules and argument-schemes, he does not hesitate to adapt them to his own purposes. He will even invert the Stoic use. Nevertheless, his frequent use of classic schemes involving conditional propositions,[31] disjunctions,[32] conjunctions,[33] and combinations of these[34] argues a more than passing acquaintance with Stoic logic. In this Origen differs from his predecessor Clement and other Middle Platonists. Origen concentrated on the different ways of interpreting conditional propositions, and these

[30] This method was not peculiarly Stoic. We find it also in Aristotle (*An. Pr.* B 457A 36.). It was a favorite move of Origen. A classic illustration can be found following a lengthy argument which concludes (*Comm. in Joann.* 2.16): *διάπερ κατὰ τὸ ὅμοιον, εἰ μηδὲν κωλύει εἶναι αὐτὸν καὶ ἑτέρων θεὸν, οὐδεν κωλύει εἶναι φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἑτέρων παρὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους φῶς.*

[31] For examples of this form see 5.7, 23; 6.11, 65; 4.18, 58, 67, 87; 8.69.

[32] For illustrations of this form see 2.33, 36, 40; 4.61, 64, 90; 5.2, 6, 61.

[33] See, for examples, 2.16 and 68.

[34] See 1.11; 5.11; 7.37; 8.73. All these examples illustrate both the influence of Stoic form as well as Origen's adaptation. The most prominent feature is the presence of the conditional and argument based on its implications. For further examples see 4.97; 5.27; 6.25; 7.37; 8.21, 28.

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ways related to theories of what was necessary and what was possible. Origen's use of the "idle argument" is a clear manifestation of this interest.[35]

One of the best indications of Origen's interest is his concern with rules for implication. He professes scorn and disdain for such rules which he calls (3.39): *τεχνολογίας ἑλληνικῆς ἀκολουθία.* Even this disdain cannot be taken seriously, because in explaining his overall approach to arguments he says that the man who is going to practise philosophy must prepare his material from all kinds of demonstrative sources, principally from the sacred writings and from that rising from the implications in the arguments (4.9). The real element in dialectic, he says, is in examining implications.[36] Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 8.231) preserves a rule for examining consequences: "Whenever we have premisses to yield a conclusion, when we have this conclusion potentially in these (premisses), even if it is not openly expressed"; and this is a *θεώρημα διαλεκτικόν.* Origen's method entails careful observance of such rules. For his method proceeds by setting out the meaning and testing it as carefully as possible, saying what occurs to one (1.71): *ἐκτιθέμενον τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐγνωμόνως αὐτὸ ἐξετάζειν καὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν λέγειν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ ὑποπίπτοντα.* He insists repeatedly that one must test the *pragma* in order to (1.12) *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὸν τῶν λέξεων νοῦν.* The methodical application of these rules is the step which separates Origen from Clement.

As we have noted, the validity of an argument for the Stoics, Sextus Empiricus affirms (*Hyp. Pyrrh.* 2.145), was determined by the implications of the conditionals. Origen held that the greatest vice in argument is to accuse the opponent of unsound consequences when the implications of his own argument deserve the same charge (6.53). Implications in Stoic logic, however, are contingent upon the truth-values of the propositions, and these in turn determine the validity of the argument.

It is in the truth-value of propositions that Origen's Stoicism partially unveils itself. A conditional for the Stoics was a proposition,

[35] The modal element was all important in the interpretation. See Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 5.9.1–9 and Mates (above, note 24) 52.

[36] See 6.25: *καὶ ἐξετάζοντες τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τοῦ εἶναι . . .*; and see *Comm. in Matth.* (*GCS* 9.148, 20; 672, 13).

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not an argument.[37] This fitted Origen's method perfectly. Origen's method involved types or levels, the lower always symbolic of the higher. Mates observed that the Stoics had need of some sort of theory of types or levels, else their view would have excluded propositions about propositions, "but we have no clues to their treatment of this problem (if they ever thought of it)."[38] I suggest that Origen provides evidence of such a theory.

CONCLUSIONS

The Stoic doctrine of the true as being in or concerned with propositions was very useful to Origen. As distinguished by the Stoics he applied it at every level: names, propositions, and argument-schemes. He takes advantage of the doctrine that a proposition is what is true or false, a *pragma* assertoric by itself (Diogenes Laertius 7.65). And however much at odds this Stoic doctrine happened to be with Stoic physics, it fitted perfectly Origen's doctrine of the "pneumatic" sense of sacred writing. His use of Stoic logic differed in this respect from that of Clement and contemporary Middle Platonists. Thus study of Origen's use of Stoic logic tends to support the research of Mates and Lucasiewicz on the history of logic.[39] Possibly new light is shed on Stoic implication theory and the conditionalization principle. In later papers I hope to develop this aspect. Here I have limited myself to three areas of Origen's work influenced by Stoic logic, the doctrine of names as applied in the Neoplatonic theurgy, the question of the truth-value of propositions, and some argument-schemes.

[37] See Mates (above, note 24), 43. "Parenthetically it may be said that there is no doubt that the term 'conditional' . . . , which was apparently first used in this technical sense by Chrysippus, retained its technical sense throughout the history of Stoic logic. *Nowhere* in the Stoic fragments is the term applied to an argument or an inference-schema; *all* examples given by ancient authors . . . are conditional propositions."

[38] Mates (above, note 24) 24. For consistency Origen's tropological method demands such a theory of types or levels including levels of propositions.

[39] Mates (above, note 24) and Jan Lukasiewics, *Aristotle's Syllogistic* (Oxford 1951); "Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik," *Erkenntnis* 5 (1935) 111–31. Study of Origen in particular strengthens the theory of the metalogical character of the Stoic system. I hope to demonstrate this in later papers.

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